We propose a class of sharing schemes for the distribution of the gains from cooperation for coalition games with externalities. In the context of the partition function, it is shown that any member of this class of sharing schemes leads to the same set of stable coalitions in the sense of...

We analyze stability of self-enforcing climate agreements based on a data set generated by the CLIMNEG world simulation model (CWSM), version 1.2. We consider two new aspects which appear important in actual treaty-making. First, we consider a sequential coalition formation process where players...

Na and Shin (1998) showed that the veil of uncertainty can be conducive to the success of self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Later papers confirmed this negative conclusion about the role of learning. In the light of intensified research efforts worldwide to reduce...

This paper compares stability of international environmental agreements for six different rules of coalition formation under very general conditions (any type of heterogeneity between countries). The rules can be interpreted as different institutional settings in which treaty formations take...

This paper analyses stability of coalitions for greenhouse gas abatement for different sharing rules applied to the gains from co-operation. We use a 12-regions model designed to examine internal and external stability of coalitions (STACO). We compare different sharing rules like, for example,...

We provide an existence and a uniqueness result for coalitional equilibria of a game in strategic form. Both results are illustrated for a public good game and a homogeneous Cournot-oligopoly game.

We analyze the formation of self-enforcing international environmental agreements under the assumption that countries announce their participation either simultaneously or sequentially. It is shown that a sequential formation process opens up possibilities for strategic behavior of countries...

The literature on international environmental agreements has recognized the role transfers play in encouraging participation in international environmental agreements (IEAs), but the few results achieved so far are overly specific and do not exploit the full potential of transfers for successful...

We empirically test stability of climate change coalitions with the STAbility of Coalitions model (STACO). The model comprises twelve world regions and captures important dynamic aspects of the climate change problem. We apply the stability concept of internal and external stability to a cartel...

According to international law, straddling fish stocks should preferably be managed cooperatively through regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs). This paper analyzes the stability and success of these organizations through a game in partition function form based on the classical...