We propose a class of sharing rules for the distribution of the gains from cooperation for partition function games with externalities. We show that this class of sharing rules is characterized by three axioms: coalitional efficiency, additivity and anonimity which are adapted to the context of...

We propose a class of sharing schemes for the distribution of the gains from cooperation for coalition games with externalities. In the context of the partition function, it is shown that any member of this class of sharing schemes leads to the same set of stable coalitions in the sense of...

We provide an existence and a uniqueness result for coalitional equilibria of a game in strategic form. Both results are illustrated for a public good game and a homogeneous Cournot-oligopoly game.

We propose a class of sharing schemes for the distribution of the gains from cooperation for coalition games with externalities. In the context of the partition function, it is shown that any member of this class of sharing schemes leads to the same set of stable coalitions in the sense of...

We argue that the new approach for studying coalitions has some advantages over the classical approach: it is better at capturing externalities between coalitions and provides a micro foundation of the coalition formation process that can be related to the design of an agreement. However, we...

We propose a class of sharing schemes for the distribution of the gains from cooperation for coalition games with externalities. In the context of the partition function, it is shown that any member of this class of sharing schemes leads to the same set of stable coalitions in the sense of...

We propose a class of sharing schemes for the distribution of the gains from cooperation for coalition games with externalities. In the context of the partition function, it is shown that any member of this class of sharing schemes leads to the same set of stable coalitions in the sense of...

We provide an existence and a uniqueness result for coalitional equilibria of a game in strategic form. Both results are illustrated for a public good game and a homogeneous Cournot-oligopoly game.