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A theory of reciprocity
Falk, Armin; Fischbacher, Urs - 2001
This paper presents a formal theory of reciprocity. Reciprocity means that people reward kind actions and punish unkind ones. The theory takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by the intention underlying this action. The theory...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398368
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The nature of human altruism
Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - EconWPA - 2004
Some of the most fundamental questions concerning our evolutionary origins, our social relations, and the organization of society are centred around issues of altruism and selfishness. Experimental evidence indicates that human altruism is a powerful force and is unique in the animal world....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408232
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Appropriating the commons : a theoretical explanation
Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - 2001
In this paper we show that a simple model of fairness preferences explains major experimental regularities of common …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398786
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A Theory of Reciprocity
Falk, Armin; Fischbacher, Urs - 2021
This paper presents a formal theory of reciprocity. Reciprocity means that people reward kind actions and punish unkind ones. The theory takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by the intention underlying this action. The theory...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013321364
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Driving forces behind informal sanctions
Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - 2005
theories of fairness and reciprocity capture these forces. We find that cooperators' punishment is almost exclusively targeted … between different fairness principles. Fairness theories that are based on the assumption that players compare their own … the defectors. Fairness theories assuming that players aim to minimize payoff inequalities cannot explain the fact that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267590
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Driving forces behind informal sanctions
Falk, Armin (contributor); Fehr, Ernst (contributor);  … - 2005
theories of fairness and reciprocity capture these forces. We find that cooperators' punishment is almost exclusively targeted … between different fairness principles. Fairness theories that are based on the assumption that players compare their own … the defectors. Fairness theories assuming that players aim to minimize payoff inequalities cannot explain the fact that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003031484
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On the Nature of Fair Behavior
Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - 2001
exclusively based on preferences over the distribution of material payoffs. Models that take into account players' fairness …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014171099
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On the Nature of Fair Behavior
Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - 2002
exclusively based on preferences over the distribution of material payoffs. Models that take into account players' fairness …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014128054
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Driving Forces Behind Informal Sanctions
Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2005
theories of fairness and reciprocity capture these forces. We find that cooperators’ punishment is almost exclusively targeted … between different fairness principles. Fairness theories that are based on the assumption that players compare their own … the defectors. Fairness theories assuming that players aim to minimize payoff inequalities cannot explain the fact that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703785
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Appropriating the Commons - A Theoretical Explanation
Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
In this Paper we show that a simple model of fairness preferences explains major experimental regularities of common …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123667