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Eisenkopf, Gerald; Fischbacher, Urs - Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Universität Konstanz - 2012

People do not like to delegate the distribution of favors. To explain this reluctance we disentangle reward motives in an experiment, in which an investor can directly transfer money to a trustee or delegate this decision to another investor. Varying the transfer values of investor and delegate,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010584356

Doing well by doing good - or doing better by delegating?

Eisenkopf, Gerald; Fischbacher, Urs - Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut an der Universität Konstanz - 2011

Machiavelli advises against delegating the distribution of favors. We test this claim in an experiment, in which an investor can directly transfer money to a trustee or delegate this decision to another investor. Varying the value of the transfers of the investor and the delegate, we find that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838448

A theory of reciprocity

Falk, Armin; Fischbacher, Urs - 2001

This paper presents a formal theory of reciprocity. Reciprocity means that people reward kind actions and punish unkind …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398368

Driving forces behind informal sanctions

Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - 2005

theories of fairness and reciprocity capture these forces. We find that cooperators' punishment is almost exclusively targeted …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267590

Testing theories of fairness - Intentions matter

Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - 2008

Recently developed models of fairness can explain a wide variety of seemingly contradictory facts. The most controversial and yet unresolved issue in the modeling of fairness preferences concerns the behavioral relevance of fairness intentions. Intuitively, fairness intentions seem to play an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009471715

Super-Additive Cooperation

Efferson, Charles; Bernhard, Helen; Fischbacher, Urs; … - 2022

mechanism reliably supports the evolution of cooperation when actions vary continuously. Ambiguous reciprocity, a strategy … can stabilise cooperative strategies against the corrosive effect of ambiguous reciprocity. Evolved strategies often … consist of cooperative reciprocity with ingroup partners and uncooperative reciprocity with outgroup partners. Results from a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014290043

A Theory of Reciprocity

Falk, Armin; Fischbacher, Urs - 2001

This paper presents a formal theory of reciprocity. Reciprocity means that people reward kind actions and punish unkind …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315175

Appropriating the Commons A Theoretical Explanation

Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - 2001

In this paper we show that a simple model of fairness preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315203

Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game

Engelmann, Dirk; Fischbacher, Urs - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003807476

Fairness, errors and the power of competition

Fischbacher, Urs; Fong, Christina M.; Fehr, Ernst - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 72 (2009) 1, pp. 527-545

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003906992