We consider discounted repeated games in which players can voluntarily purchase information about the opponents’ actions at past stages. Information about a stage can be bought at a fixed but arbitrary cost. Opponents cannot observe the information purchase by a player. For our main result, we...

We examine product-games, which are n-player stochastic games satisfying: (1) the state space is a product S(1)×…×S(n); (2) the action space of any player i only depends of the i-th coordinate of the state; (3) the transition probability of moving from s(i) ∈ S(i) to t(i) ∈S(i), on the...

We examine so-called product-games. These are n-player stochatic games played on a product state space S(1)U…S(n), in which player i controls the transitions on S(i). For the general n-player case, we establish the existence of 0-equilibria. In addition, for the case of two-player zero-sum...

We consider a class of n-player stochastic games with the following properties: (1) in every state, the transitions are controlled by one player, (2) the payoffs are equal to zero in every non-absorbing state, (3) the payoffs are non-negative in every absorbing state. With respect to the...

We consider a game Gn played by two players. There are n independent random variables Z1, ... , Zn, each of which is uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Both players know n, the independence and the distribution of these random variables, but only player 1 knows the vector of realizations...

We consider discounted repeated games in which players can voluntarily purchase information about the opponents' actions at past stages. Information about a stage can be bought at a fixed but arbitrary cost. Opponents cannot observe the information purchase by a player. For our main result, we...