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L'économie de la preuve judiciaire.
Fluet, Claude - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2011
Cet article développe un modèle simple permettant d’analyser les dispositifs fondamentaux de la preuve judiciaire. Le survol est centré sur les notions de charge de la preuve, de présomptions légales, de normes de preuve, sur le rôle de la procédure et le pouvoir d’initiative du juge....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008833197
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Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS - 2011
Two firms produce a product with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic that we call quality. The difference in the quality levels determines how the firms share the market. Consumers do not observe quality before purchase. Under non-comparative advertising a firm signals its own quality,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010957297
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Strategic communication with reporting costs
Fluet, Claude; Emons, Winand - 2016
A decision-maker relies on information of parties affected by her decision. These parties try to influence her decision … constrains their ability to manipulate information. We depart from this literature by introducing a cost to communicate. Our … parties trade off their reporting cost against the effect on the decision. Typically, they never reveal all information. A …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011583287
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Uncertain bequest needs and long-term Insurance contracts
Fei, Wenan; Fluet, Claude; Schlesinger, Harris - 2008
We examine how long-term life insurance contracts can be designed to incorporate uncertain future bequest needs. An individual who buys a life insurance contract early in life is often uncertain about the future financial needs of his or her family, in the event of an untimely death. Ideally,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264521
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The First-Order Approach when the Cost of Effort is Money
Fagart, Marie-Cécile; Fluet, Claude - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2012
We provide sufficient conditions for the first-order approach in the principal-agent problem when the agent’s utility has the non-separable form u(y - c(a)) where y is the contractual payoff and c(a) is the money cost of effort. We first consider a decision-maker facing prospects which cost...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010540951
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Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - 2011
Two firms produce a product with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic that we call quality. The difference in the quality levels determines how the firms share the market. Consumers do not observe quality before purchase. Under non-comparative advertising a firm signals its own quality,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010305948
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Non-comparative versus comparative advertising as a quality signal
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - 2008
Two firms produce a product with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic. We call the vertical characteristic quality. The difference in the quality levels determines how the firms share the market. Firms know the quality levels, consumers do not. Under non-comparative advertising a firm may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316055
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Adversarial versus inquisitorial testimony
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - 2009
An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors, or the two parties to the conflict may present further evidence. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. At equilibrium the two parties never testify together. When the evidence is much in favor of one party, this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316067
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The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors or he can ask for further evidence from the two parties to the conflict. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favour at a cost. The arbiter is concerned about accuracy and low procedural costs. When both parties testify, each of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005788951
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Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors, or the two parties to the conflict may present further evidence. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. At equilibrium the two parties never testify together. When the evidence is much in favor of one party, this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008459770