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Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - Department Volkswirtschaftlehre, Universität Bern - 2009
An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors, or the two parties to the conflict may present further evidence. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. At equilibrium the two parties never testify together. When the evidence is much in favor of one party, this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005049532
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Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors or he can ask for further evidence from the two parties to the conflict. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favour at a cost. The arbiter is concerned about accuracy and low procedural costs. When both parties testify, each of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504723
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Uncertain Bequest Needs and Long-Term Insurance Contracts
Fei, Wenan; Fluet, Claude; Schlesinger, Harris - CESifo - 2008
We examine how long-term life insurance contracts can be designed to incorporate uncertain future bequest needs. An individual who buys a life insurance contract early in life is often uncertain about the future financial needs of his or her family, in the event of an untimely death. Ideally,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005405924
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Relying on the Information of Others: Debt Rescheduling with Multiple Lenders
Fluet, Claude; Garella, Paolo G. - Dipartimento di Economia, Management e Metodi … - 2007
arrangements? Can a lender reschedule, betting against his odds? Private information in the form of bad but coarse news, that would … information. At equilibrium, rescheduling occurs even if all lenders received bad news. This is ine¢ cient (increasing the cost of … capital) compared to perfect information sharing. However, barren information sharing, at equilibrium there is no excess …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005738657
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Ranking of Information Systems in Agency Models: An Integral Condition
Demougin, Dominique; Fluet, Claude - Centre de Recherche sur l'Emploi et les Fluctuations … - 1998
We provide an integral condition for the ranking of general information systems in the agency problem. The condition … ratio distributions <P> Nous présentons un critère intégral pour le classement des systèmes d'information dans les problèmes …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005611920
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Monitoring, Moral Hazard and Limited Liability.
Demougin, Dominique; Fluet, Claude - Département des Sciences Économiques, École des … - 1995
Cet article analyse les propriétés de complémentarité et de substituabilité entre systèmes de surveillance et mécanismes incitatifs dans une relation principal-agent, lorsque les parties sont neutres à l'égard du risque et que l'agent fait face à une contrainte de solvabilité. À...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005611962
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Régulation des risques et insolvabilité: le rôle de la responsabilité pour faute en information imparfaite
Fluet, Claude - Département des Sciences Économiques, École des … - 1998
'une information imparfaite sur le comportement de l'agent. En particulier, je montre que le critère juridique de la prépondérance de … only imperfect information on the level of care. In particular, I show that the legal practice concerning standards of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005611971
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Non-comparative versus comparative advertising of quality
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - In: International Journal of Industrial Organization 30 (2012) 4, pp. 352-360
Two firms produce a good with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic called quality. The difference in the unobservable quality levels determines how the firms share the market. We consider two scenarios: In the first one, firms disclose quality; in the second one, they send costly signals...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573874
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Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2013
Victims want to collect damages from injurers. Cases differ with respect to the judgment. Attorneys observe the expected judgment, clients do not. Victims need an attorney to sue; defense attorneys reduce the probability that the plaintiff prevails. Plaintiffs’ attorneys offer contingent fees...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010702340
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Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - Department Volkswirtschaftlehre, Universität Bern - 2013
Victims want to collect damages from injurers. Cases differ with respect to the judgment. Attorneys observe the expected judgment, clients do not. Victims need an attorney to sue; defense attorneys reduce the probability that the plaintiff prevails. Plaintiffs' attorneys offer contingent fees...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010702352