Can debt rescheduling decisions differ in multiple lenders’ versus a single lender loan? Do multiple lenders efficiently react to information? We show that the precision of information plays an essential role. Foreclosing by one lender is disruptive so that a lender can rationally wait for the...

We provide sufficient conditions for the first-order approach in the principal-agent problem when the agent’s utility has the non-separable form u(y - c(a)) where y is the contractual payoff and c(a) is the money cost of effort. We first consider a decision-maker facing prospects which cost...

Can inertia in terminating unsuccessful loans (creditor passivity) be due to the multiplicity of lenders in loan arrangements? Can a lender reschedule, betting against his odds? Private information in the form of bad but coarse news, that would prompt foreclosure on its own, will instead lead to...

Can debt rescheduling decisions differ in multiple lenders' versus a single lender loan? Do multiple lenders efficiently react to information? We show that the precision of information plays an essential role. Foreclosing by one lender is disruptive so that a lender can rationally wait for the...

We provide sufficient conditions for the first-order approach in the principal-agent problem when the agent’s utility has the nonseparable form u(y−c(a)) where y is the contractual payoff and c(a) is the money cost of effort. We first consider a decision-maker facing prospects which cost...

We use a principal-agent framework to reexamine the implications of the negligence and strict liability rules when the tort-feasor is an agency. We assume a unilateral care situation and consider both the cases of moral hazard and of adverse selection. In both instances the negligence rule is...

Cet article analyse les politiques de réglementation et d'achat public sur plusieurs périodes en présence d'asymétrie d'information entre le régulateur et les entreprises réglementées. Le cadre général de Laffont et Tirole est utilisé. Nous proposons une analyse graphique du modèle de...

Two firms produce a good with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic called quality. The difference in the unobservable quality levels determines how the firms share the market. We consider two scenarios: in the first one, firms disclose quality; in the second one, they send costly signals...

Two firms produce a good with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic called quality. The difference in the unobservable quality levels determines how the firms share the market. We consider two scenarios: In the first one, firms disclose quality; in the second one, they send costly signals...

An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors, or the two parties to the conflict may present further evidence. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. At equilibrium the two parties never testify together. When the evidence is much in favor of one party, this...