We analyze vertical integration to compare outcomes under upstream competition and monopoly. This is done in a model based on the property rights approach to firm boundaries and where multilateral negotiations are modelled using a fully specified, noncooperative bargaining game. We demonstrate...

This paper considers the effect of exclusive contracts on investment decisions in a market with two upstream and two downstream firms. Segal and Whinston's (2000) irrelevance result is generalised and it is shown that exclusive contracts have no effect on the equilibrium level of internal...

We analyze vertical integration in the case of upstream competition and compare outcomes to the case where upstream assets are owned by a single agent (i.e., upstream monopoly). In so doing, we make two contributions to the modelling of strategic vertical integration. First, we base industry...

This paper provides a simple model of bargaining and integration within a network and considers how intra-network structure is impacted on by competition between networks. Apart from its analytical tractability, our model demonstrates how integration can be used strategically to redistribute...