Similar Search Results

Information disclosure to Cournot duopolists

Eliaz, Kfir; Forges, Françoise - In: Economics letters 126 (2015), pp. 167-170

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377243

Equlibria with communication in a job market example

Forges, Françoise - In: The quarterly journal of economics 105 (1990) 2, pp. 375-398

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001092025

Long persuasion games

Forges, Françoise; Koessler, Frédéric - 2006

's information is certifiable. The first equilibrium characterization is provided for unilateral persuasion games, and the second for … his equilibrium payoff compared to all equilibria of the unilateral persuasion game by delaying information certification. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273734

Long persuasion games

Forges, Françoise (contributor); … - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003305022

Long persuasion games

Forges, Françoise; Koessler, Frédéric - In: Journal of economic theory 143 (2008) 1, pp. 1-35

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003812133

Long persuasion games

Forges, Françoise (contributor); … - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003301085

Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk : the two-player case

Vida, Péter; Forges, Françoise - 2011

We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a pos-sibly infinitely long...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009010498

Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk : the two-player case

Vida, Péter; Forges, Françoise - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 8 (2013) 1, pp. 95-123

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009712429

Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types

Forges, Françoise; Koessler, Frédéric - In: Journal of mathematical economics 41 (2005) 7, pp. 793-811

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003154309

Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types

Forges, Françoise (contributor); … - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001760412