Showing 1 - 10 of 13
Nous considérons la vente aux enchères sous pli scellé au second prix d'un objet que chaque acquéreur potentiel évalue de manière « privée et indépendante ». Nous montrons que l'optimum ex ante d'un cartel, sous contraintes d'incitation et d'équilibre ex post des transferts, coïncide...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008543991
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008543994
Afriat proved the equivalence of a variant of the strong axiom of revealed preference and the existence of a solution to a set of linear inequalities. From this solution he constructed a utility function rationalizing the choices of a competitive consumer. We extend Afriat's theorem to a class...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008551679
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008529674
This paper studies the set of equilibria that can be achieved by adding general communication systems to Bayesian games in which some information can be certified or, equivalently, in which players’ types are partially verifiable. Certifiability of information is formalized by a set of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008532318
Le coeur ex ante incitatif d'une économie d'échange en information incomplète est le coeur, au sens de la théorie des jeux coopératifs standard, d'une fonction caractéristique qui rend compte du fait que les coalitions allouent les biens grâce à des mécanismes aléatoires incitatifs....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008532408
We consider two-sided matching markets in which agents have private information on a state of nature which determines the agents' utilities of matching. Monetary transfers are allowed and utility functions are quasi-linear. The model thus extends the assignment game introduced by Shapley and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008532579
In a commonvalueauction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core-stable. More precisely, the ex ante expected utilities of rings, at the (noncooperative) sophisticated equilibrium proposed by Einy et al. [Einy, E., Haimanko, O., Orzach, R., Sela, A.,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009493427
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008832170
We propose two classes of allocation games for N.T.U. and T.U. exchange economies in which initial endowments and preferences depend on the agents’ private information. In both models, agents make non-verifiable claims about their types and effective deposits of consumption goods, which are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009024336