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On the dynamics of segregation

Dahlberg, Matz; Fredriksson, Peter; Jofre-Monseny, Jordi - 2011 - Work in progress.

Card et al (2008a) formalize a model of ethnic residential segregation where an ethnically mixed neighborhood is dynamically stable until its minority share reaches a threshold (the tipping point). Once the neighborhood has surpassed the tipping point, it will experience massive white flight....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011508664

Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research

Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Uppsala Universitet - 2003

that the case for imposing a penalty on less active job search is fairly solid. A growing number of empirical studies …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005419180

Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions

Boone, Jan; Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil; van … - 2001

This paper analyzes the design of optimal unemployment insurance in a search equilibrium framework where search effort … among the unemployed is not perfectly observable. We examine to what extent the optimal policy involves monitoring of search … effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is deemed insufficient. We find that introducing monitoring and sanctions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262603

Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions

Boone, Jan; Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil; van … - 2001

This paper analyzes the design of optimal unemployment insurance in a search equilibrium framework where search effort … among the unemployed is not perfectly observable. We examine to what extent the optimal policy involves monitoring of search … effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is deemed insufficient. We find that introducing monitoring and sanctions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315262

Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research

Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil - 2003

that the case for imposing a penalty on less active job search is fairly solid. A growing number of empirical studies …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315692

Optimal Unemployment Insurance Design: Time Limits, Monitoring, or Workfare?

Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil - 2003

monitoring and sanctions restores search incentives most effectively, since it brings additional incentives to search actively so …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315950

Optimal unemployment insurance with monitoring and sanctions

Boone, Jan; Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil; van … - 2002

This paper analyzes the design of optimal unemployment insurance in a search equilibrium framework where search effort … among the unemployed is not perfectly observable. We examine to what extent the optimal policy involves monitoring of search … effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is deemed insufficient. We find that introducing monitoring and sanctions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321089

Improving incentives in unemployment insurance: A review of recent research

Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil - 2003

that the case for imposing a penalty on less active job search is fairly solid. A growing number of empirical studies …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321098

Optimal Unemployment Insurance Design:Time Limits, Monitoring, or Workfare?

Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil - 2003

monitoring and sanctions restores search incentives most effectively, since it brings additional incentives to search actively so …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321532

Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research

Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil - 2003

that the case for imposing a penalty on less active job search is fairly solid. A growing number of empirical studies …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321601

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