that the case for imposing a penalty on less active job search is fairly solid. A growing number of empirical studies …

This paper analyzes the design of optimal unemployment insurance in a search equilibrium framework where search effort … among the unemployed is not perfectly observable. We examine to what extent the optimal policy involves monitoring of search … effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is deemed insufficient. We find that introducing monitoring and sanctions …

This paper analyzes the design of optimal unemployment insurance in a search equilibrium framework where search effort … among the unemployed is not perfectly observable. We examine to what extent the optimal policy involves monitoring of search … effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is deemed insufficient. We find that introducing monitoring and sanctions …

that the case for imposing a penalty on less active job search is fairly solid. A growing number of empirical studies …

monitoring and sanctions restores search incentives most effectively, since it brings additional incentives to search actively so …

This paper analyzes the design of optimal unemployment insurance in a search equilibrium framework where search effort … among the unemployed is not perfectly observable. We examine to what extent the optimal policy involves monitoring of search … effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is deemed insufficient. We find that introducing monitoring and sanctions …

that the case for imposing a penalty on less active job search is fairly solid. A growing number of empirical studies …

monitoring and sanctions restores search incentives most effectively, since it brings additional incentives to search actively so …

that the case for imposing a penalty on less active job search is fairly solid. A growing number of empirical studies …