Similar Search Results

Optimal unemployment insurance design: Time limits, monitoring, or workfare

Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil - 2005

This paper analyses crucial design features of unemployment insurance (UI) policies. We examine three different means of improving the efficiency of UI: the duration of benefit payments, monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. To that end we develop a quantitative model of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317971

Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions

Boone, Jan; Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil; van … - 2001

This paper analyzes the design of optimal unemployment insurance in a search equilibrium framework where search effort among the unemployed is not perfectly observable. We examine to what extent the optimal policy involves monitoring of search effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262603

What active labor market policy works in a recession?

Forslund, Anders; Fredriksson, Peter; Vikström, Johan - 2011

relative effectiveness of different kinds of programs over the business cycle. In particular we compare an on-the-job training … scheme with (traditional) labor market training. We find that labor market training is relatively more effective in recession …. This result is consistent with our priors since labor market training features relative large lock-in effects. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273976

Mandatory Advance Notice of Layoff: Evidence and Efficiency Considerations

Cederlöf, Jonas; Fredriksson, Peter; Nekoei, Arash; … - 2021

We investigate a prevalent, but understudied, employment protection policy: mandatory advance notice (MN), requiring employers to notify employees of forthcoming layoffs. MN increases future production, as notified workers search on the job, but reduces current production as they supply less...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012657914

Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions

Boone, Jan; Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil; Ours, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

This Paper analyses the design of optimal unemployment insurance in a search equilibrium framework where search effort among the unemployed is not perfectly observable. We examine to what extent the optimal policy involves monitoring of search effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498018

Optimal unemployment insurance with monitoring and sanctions

Boone, Jan; Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil; van … - Institutet för Arbetsmarknads- och Utbildningspolitisk … - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423975

Mandatory notice and layoff, job search, and efficiency

Cederlöf, Jonas; Fredriksson, Peter; Nekoei, Arash; … - 2024

In all OECD countries, Mandatory Notice (MN) policies require firms to inform workers in advance of a layoff. In our theoretical framework, MN helps workers avoid unemployment and find better jobs by encouraging workers to search for a new job while still employed, thereby increasing future...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015130126

Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions

Boone, Jan; Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil; Ours, … - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005763574

Optimal unemployment insurance design: time limits, monitoring, or workfare?

Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil - Institutet för Arbetsmarknads- och Utbildningspolitisk … - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005651818

Employment, mobility, and active labor market programs

Fredriksson, Peter; Johansson, Per - Institutet för Arbetsmarknads- och Utbildningspolitisk … - 2003

and increase mobility in the longer run. We consider two prototype programs: job creation programs and training programs …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005651864