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Managerial power and rent extraction in the design of executive compensation

Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Fried, Jesse M.; Walker, David I. - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001674423

Managerial power and rent extraction in the design of executive compensation

Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Fried, Jesse M.; Walker, David I. - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001685998

Pay without performance : overview of the issues

Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Fried, Jesse M. - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003177369

Managerial power and rent extraction in the design of executive compensation

Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013424133

Short-termism, shareholder payouts, and investment in the EU

Fried, Jesse M.; Wang, Charles C. Y. - 2020

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012428136

Short-termism, shareholder payouts, and investment in the EU

Fried, Jesse M.; Wang, Charles C. Y. - 2020

for the EU to better insulate managers from shareholder pressure. But the evidence offered---rising levels of repurchases …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012511344

Alibaba: a case study of synthetic control

Fried, Jesse M.; Kamar, Ehud - 2020

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012427117

Rationalizing the Dodd-Frank clawback

Fried, Jesse M. - 2016

On July 1, 2015, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed an excess-pay clawback rule to implement the provisions of Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act. I explain why the SEC's proposed Dodd-Frank clawback, while reducing executives' incentives to misreport, is overbroad. The economy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011578666

Executive compensation as an agency problem

Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Fried, Jesse M. - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001760537

Executive compensation as an agency problem

Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Fried, Jesse M. - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001773447