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The European Commission's Sustainable Corporate Governance Report : A Critique

Roe, Mark J.; Spamann, Holger; Fried, Jesse M.; Wang, … - 2021

In July 2020, the European Commission published the “Study on directors’ duties and sustainable corporate governance” by EY. The Report purports to find evidence of debilitating short-termism in EU corporate governance and recommends many changes to support sustainable corporate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013235672

Share Repurchases, Equity Issuances, and the Optimal Design of Executive Pay

Fried, Jesse M. - 2011

This Article identifies a cost to public investors of tying executive pay to the future value of a firm's stock - even its long-term value. In particular, such an arrangement can incentivize executives to engage in share repurchases (when the current stock price is low) and equity issuances...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013123251

Share Repurchases, Equity Issuances, and the Optimal Design of Executive Pay

Fried, Jesse M. - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013125003

Alibaba : A Case Study of Synthetic Control

Fried, Jesse M.; Kamar, Ehud - 2021

Alibaba, the NYSE-traded Chinese ecommerce giant, is currently valued at over $700 billion. But Alibaba’s governance is opaque, obscuring who controls the firm. We show that Jack Ma, who now owns only about 5%, can effectively control Alibaba by controlling an entirely different firm: Ant...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013245938

Pay Without Performance : The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation

Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2019

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012746532

Executive Compensation at Fannie Mae : A Case Study of Perverse Incentives, Nonperformance Pay, and Camouflage

Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2009

This paper is a case study of Fannie Mae's executive compensation arrangements during the period 2000-2004. We identify and analyze four problems with these arrangements:- First, by richly rewarding executives for reporting higher earnings, without requiring return of the compensation if...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012721851

Stealth Compensation Via Retirement Benefits

Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2009

This Article analyzes an important form of stealth compensation provided to managers of public companies. We show how …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012721903

Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2009

instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers' performance. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012722043

Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation

Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2009

constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012722081

Pay Without Performance : Overview of the Issues

Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2009

whose pay they set. We discuss how managers' influence can explain many features of the executive compensation landscape …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012767546