This paper presents experimental evidence that tax compliance is path dependent. We show that individuals faced with the same current tax enforcement parameters, will nevertheless choose different compliance if they have faced different tax enforcement parameters in the past. This finding has...

This paper presents experimental evidence that contributions to a public good can be path-dependent for a limited time span. We study a repeated linear public-good game with punishment opportunities. Our data shows that subjects who had experienced a higher marginal return on public-good...

This paper presents results from an experiment studying a two-person 4x4 pure coordination game. We seek to identify a labeling of actions that induces subjects to select all options with the same probability. Such a display of actions must be free from salient properties that might be used by...

This exploratory note presents experimental evidence on how the design of law enforcement impacts legal compliance and detection avoidance. The experiment varies the enforcer's identity and the use of fine revenue. The data show that the level of detection avoidance is indeed influenced by the...