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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009425905
We formulate a dynamic game model of trade in an exhaustible resource with a quantity-setting cartel. We compute the feedback Nash equilibrium and two Stackelberg equilibria under two different leadership scenarios: leadership by the strategic importing country, and leadership by the exporting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009488895
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009720327
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009514807
Does a country strictly gain if it acts as a leader in a resource market under bilateral monopoly? Using differential games, we show that the answer is "yes" when leadership can be exercised globally (global Stackelberg leadership), but possibly "no" when it is exercised only at each stage...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014194992
Constructing a dynamic game model of trade of an exhaustible resource, this paper compares feedback Nash and Stackelberg equilibria when the exporting country sets quantity rather than price. We consider two different leadership scenarios: leadership by the importing country, and leadership by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013111229
We formulate a dynamic game model of trade in an exhaustible resource with a quantity-setting cartel. We compute the feedback Nash equilibrium and two Stackelberg equilibria under two different leadership scenarios: leadership by the strategic importing country, and leadership by the exporting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013091687
Formulating a dynamic game model of a world exhaustible resource market, this paper studies welfare implications of Stackelberg leaderships for an individual country and the world. We overcome the problem of time-inconsistency by imposing a \credibility condition" on the Markovian strategy of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009323098
We formulate a dynamic game model of trade in an exhaustible resource with a quantity-setting cartel. We compute the feedback Nash equilibrium and two Stackelberg equilibria under two different leadership scenarios: leadership by the strategic importing country, and leadership by the exporting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009645651
Constructing a dynamic game model of trade of an exhaustible resource, this paper compares feedback Nash and Stackelberg equilibria. We consider two dierent leadership scenarios: leadership by the importing country, and leadership by the exporting country. We numerically show that as compared to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009649834