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We show that neither Peleg's nor Tadenuma's well-known axiomatizations of the core by non-emptiness, individual … balanced TU games are considered, even if anonymity is required in addition. Moreover, we show that the core and its relative …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012845663
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A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A one-point solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. In this paper we discuss a class of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325319
One of the main issues in economics is the trade-off between marginalism and egalitarianism. In the context of cooperative games this trade-off can be framed as one of choosing to allocate according to the Shapley value or the equal division solution. In this paper we provide tools that make it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325573
We generalize the null player property (satisfied by the Shapley value) and nullifying player property (satisfied by the equal division solution) to the so-called delta-reducing player property, stating that a delta-reducing player (being a player such that any coalition containing this player...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326064
A (point-valued) solution for cooperative games with transferable utility, or simply TU-games, assigns a payoff vector to every TU-game. In this paper we discuss two classes of equal surplus sharing solutions, one consisting of all convex combinations of the equal division solution and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326277
We propose and characterize weighted-egalitarian values for cooperative transferable utility games. Each weighted-egalitarian value divides the worth of the grand coalition into two parts and allocates them through equality and proportionality based on exogenous player weights. We characterize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014547733
We present axiomatic characterizations of the proportional division value for TU-games, a value that distributes the worth of the grand coalition in proportion to the stand-alone worths of its members. First, a new proportionality principle, called balanced treatment, is introduced by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012233946
We introduce a family of values for TU-games that offers a compromise between the proportional and equal division values. Each value, called an alpha-mollified value, is obtained in two steps. First, a linear function with respect to the worths of all coalitions is defined which associates a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012427154
In this paper, we study the implications of extending the balanced cost reduction property from queueing problems to general games. As a direct translation of the balanced cost reduction property, the axiom of balanced externalities for solutions of games, requires that the payoff of any player...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012605990