. To this end, we conduct a repeated public goods experiment with and without punishment using samples from the laboratory … interactive experimentation. We find that basic behavioral patterns of cooperation and punishment in the laboratory are replicable …

inclinations. The third pillar are sanctions meted out to anyone who does not cooperate; ideally punishment can work as a mere … findings, in particular with regard to punishment behaviour. The chapter concludes with remarks on future research. …

. To this end, we conduct a repeated public goods experiment with and without punishment using samples from the laboratory … interactive experimentation. We find that basic behavioral patterns of cooperation and punishment in the laboratory are replicable …

This paper provides evidence that free riders are heavily punished even if punishment is costly and does not provide … punished. As a consequence, the existence of an opportunity for costly punishment causes a large increase in cooperation levels … because potential free riders face a credible threat. We show, in particular, that in the presence of a costly punishment …

This paper provides evidence that free riders are heavily punished even if punishment is costly and does not provide … punished. As a consequence, the existence of an opportunity for costly punishment causes a large increase in cooperation levels … because potential free riders face a credible threat. We show, in particular, that in the presence of a costly punishment …

inclinations. The third pillar are sanctions meted out to anyone who does not cooperate; ideally punishment can work as a mere … findings, in particular with regard to punishment behaviour. The chapter concludes with remarks on future research. …

; and, as a behavioural indicator of disapproval, punishment. Our findings are that, for a given pattern of contributions …, neither punishment nor emotion depends on the Give versus Take framing that we manipulate. To this extent, they suggest that …