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One-shot interaction and repeated interaction often co-exist in the real world. We study possible behavioral effects of this co-existence in a principal-agent setting, in which a principal simultaneously employs a permanent and a temporary agent. Our experimental results indicate that there is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005870887
Does geographic distance or the perceived social distance between subjects significantlyaffect proposer and responder behavior in ultimatum bargaining? To answer this question,subjects play a one-shot ultimatum game with three players (proposer, responder, and apassive dummy player) and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866606
Systematic experiments with distribution games (for a survey, see Roth, 1995, ) haveshown that participants are strongly motivated by fairness and efficiency considerations.This evidence, however, results mainly from experimental designs asking directly for sharingmonetary rewards. But even when...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866809
A firm with stochastic demand can rely on hired hands when demand is low and rent additionallabour when demand is higher. For high demand this implies the co-employmentof hired hands, paid directly by the firm, and of rented hands who are paid by a rentalagency. This may cause severe problems if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866944
Fairness is a strong concern as shown by dictator and ultimatum experiments. Efficiency, measured by the sum of individual payoffs, is a potentially competing concern in games such as the prisoners' dilemma. In our experiment participants can increase efficiency by gift giving. In the one-sided...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867006
Whether incentive contracts perform better than trust in terms of productiveefficiency is usually explored by principal …, we find that (mutual) trust is as good as incentivecontracts in inducing costly actions by employees. Moreover, we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867038