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Auctions and leaks: A theoretical and experimental investigation
Fischer, Sven; Güth, Werner; Kaplan, Todd R.; Zultan, Ro'i - 2014
We study first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding where second movers may discover the … usual revenue dominance of first-price over second-price auctions. With a high probability of a leak, second-price auctions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010500151
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Auctions and leaks : a theoretical and experimental investigation
Fischer, Sven Heiko; Güth, Werner; Kaplan, Todd R.; … - 2014 - This version: November 5, 2014
We study first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding where second movers may discover the … usual revenue dominance of first-price over second-price auctions. With a high probability of a leak, second-price auctions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010433909
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Auctions and Leaks: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation
Fischer, Sven; Güth, Werner; Kaplan, Todd R.; Ro'i Zultan - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014
We study first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding where second movers may discover the … usual revenue dominance of first-price over second-price auctions. With a high probability of a leak, second-price auctions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010961052
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Privately contributing to public goods over time: An experimental study
Güth, Werner; Levati, Maria Vittoria; Stiehler, Andreas - 2002
Similar to Levati and Neugebauer (2001), a clock is used by which participants can vary their individual contributions for voluntarily providing a public good. As time goes by, participants either in(de)crease their contribution gradually or keep it constant. Groups of two poorly and two richly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010310565
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Privately contributing to public goods over time : an experimental study
Güth, Werner; Levati, Maria Vittoria; Stiehler, Andreas - 2002
Similar to Levati and Neugebauer (2001), a clock is used by which participants can vary their individual contributions for voluntarily providing a public good. As time goes by, participants either in(de)crease their contribution gradually or keep it constant. Groups of two poorly and two richly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009620765
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Privately Contributing to Public Goods over Time - An Experimental Study -
Güth, Werner; Levati, Maria Vittoria; Stiehler, Andreas - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft
Similar to Levati and Neugebauer (2001), a clock is used by which participants can vary their individual contributions for voluntarily providing a public good. As time goes by, participants either in(de)crease their contribution gradually or keep it constant. Groups of two poorly and two richly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005252197
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Privately contributing to public goods over time: An experimental study
Güth, Werner; Levati, Maria Vittoria; Stiehler, Andreas - Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und … - 2002
Similar to Levati and Neugebauer (2001), a clock is used by which participants can vary their individual contributions for voluntarily providing a public good. As time goes by, participants either in(de)crease their contribution gradually or keep it constant. Groups of two poorly and two richly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010983833
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Auctions and fair division games under different price rules: Individual bid functions, prices and efficiency rates
Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Königstein, … - 1999
In auctions an outside seIler offers a commodity for sale and collects the revenue w hich is achieved. In fair division …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010309999
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Learning to bid: An experimental study of bid function adjustments in auctions and fair division games
Güth, Werner; Ivanova, Radosveta; Königstein, Manfred; … - 1999
We examine learning behavior in auctions and Fair division games with independent private values under two different …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010310061
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Auctions and leaks : a theoretical and experimental investigation
Fischer, Sven; Güth, Werner; Kaplan, Todd R.; Zultan, Ro'i - 2017 - Revised Version of JERP 2014-027
In first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding, second movers may discover the first movers … eliminate the usual revenue dominance of first- over second-price auctions. With a high leak probability, second-price auctions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011738563