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Concession bargaining: An experimental comparison of protocols and time horizons
Alberti, Federica; Fischer, Sven; Güth, Werner; … - 2013
Concessions try to avoid conflict in bargaining and can finally lead to an agreement. Although they usually are seen as …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369305
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Concession bargaining : an experimental comparison of protocols and time horizons
Alberti, Federica; Fischer, Sven; Güth, Werner; … - 2013
Concessions try to avoid conflict in bargaining and can finally lead to an agreement. Although they usually are seen as …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010252385
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Concession Bargaining - An Experimental Comparison of Protocols and Time Horizons
Alberti, Federica; Fischer, Sven; Güth, Werner; … - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013
Concessions try to avoid conflict in bargaining and can finally lead to an agreement. Although they usually are seen as …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884456
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Would you mind if I get more? An experimental study of the envy game
Casal, Sandro; Güth, Werner; Jia, Mofei; Ploner, Matteo - 2011
setting in which there is no conflict in material interests: a proposer, holding the role of residual claimant, chooses the … harms the proposer. Notwithstanding, maximal claims by proposers are predominant for all game types. This generates conflict …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281655
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Would you mind if I get more? : an experimental study of the envy game
Casal, Sandro; Güth, Werner; Jia, Mofei; Ploner, Matteo - 2011
setting in which there is no conflict in material interests: a proposer, holding the role of residual claimant, chooses the … harms the proposer. Notwithstanding, maximal claims by proposers are predominant for all game types. This generates conflict … and results in a considerable loss of efficiency. -- Social Preferences ; Conflict ; Experimental Economics ; Bargaining …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009374671
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Would You Mind if I Get More? An Experimental Study of the Envy Game
Casal, Sandro; Güth, Werner; Jia, Mofei; Ploner, Matteo - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011
setting in which there is no conflict in material interests: a proposer, holding the role of residual claimant, chooses the … harms the proposer. Notwithstanding, maximal claims by proposers are predominant for all game types. This generates conflict …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009358618
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Would you mind if I get more? An experimental study of the envy game
Casal, Sandro; Güth, Werner; Jia, Mofei; Ploner, Matteo - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 84 (2012) 3, pp. 857-865
setting in which there is no conflict in material interests: a proposer, holding the role of residual claimant, chooses the … harms the proposer. Notwithstanding, maximal claims by proposers are predominant for all game types. This generates conflict …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011048077
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Who Cares When Value (Mis)Reporting May Be Found Out? An Acquiring-a-Company Experiment with Value Messages and Information Leaks
Di Cagno, Daniela; Güth, Werner; Lohse, Tim; Marazzi, … - 2023
We modify the Acquiring-a-Company game to study lying in ultimatum bargaining. Privately informed sellers send messages about the alleged value of their company to potential buyers. Via random information leaks, buyers can learn the true value before proposing a price which the seller finally...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014377381
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Who Cares When Value (Mis)reporting May Be Found Out?
di Cagno, Daniela Teresa; Güth, Werner; Lohse, Tim; … - 2022
In an ultimatum bargaining, we investigate lying as falsely stating what one privately knows without, however, excluding that others find out the truth. Specifically, we modify the Acquiring-a-Company game. Privately informed sellers send messages about the alleged value of their company to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013307087
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Who Cares When Value (Mis)Reporting May Be Found Out? An Acquiring-a-Company Experiment with Value Messages and Information Leaks
Di Cagno, Daniela; Güth, Werner; Lohse, Tim; Marazzi, … - 2023
We modify the Acquiring-a-Company game to study lying in ultimatum bargaining. Privately informed sellers send messages about the alleged value of their company to potential buyers. Via random information leaks, buyers can learn the true value before proposing a price which the seller finally...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014354913