In repeated public good experiments, reciprocity helps to sustain high levels of cooperation. Can this be achieved by location choices in addition to making contributions? It is more realistic to rely on an intuitive neighborhood model for community members who interact repeatedly. In our...

This paper reports results of a 100-round Yes-No game experiment conducted under the random matching protocol. In contrast to ultimatum bargaining, the responder in the Yes-No game decides whether to accept without knowing the proposer’s offer. Although both games have the same solution...

In this paper a game model is considered whose strategically interacting agents are a polluting firm that can save abatement costs by illegal waste emissions and a monitoring agent (controller) whose job it is to prevent such pollution. When deciding on whether to dispose of its waste legally or...

If the future market wage is uncertain, engaging in long–term employment is risky, with the risk depending on how regulated the labor market is. In our experiment long–term employment can result either from offering long–term contracts or from repeatedly and mutually opting for...