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Endogenous community formation and collective provision – A procedurally fair mechanism
Güth, Werner - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 108 (2014) C, pp. 389-395
A group of actors, individuals or firms, can engage in collectively providing projects which may be costly or generating revenues and which may benefit some and harm others. Based on requirements of procedural fairness, we derive a bidding mechanism determining endogenously who participates in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011116861
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Endogenous Community Formation and Collective Provision - A Procedurally Fair Mechanism
Güth, Werner - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013
A group of actors, individuals or firms, can engage in collectively providing projects which may be costly or generating revenues and which may benefit some and harm others. Based on requirements of procedural fairness (Güth and Kliemt, 2013), we derive a bidding mechanism determining...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010631674
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Endogenous community formation and collective provision: A procedurally fair mechanism
Güth, Werner - 2013
A group of actors, individuals or firms, can engage in collectively providing projects which may be costly or generating revenues and which may benefit some and harm others. Based on requirements of procedural fairness (Güth and Kliemt, 2013), we derive a bidding mechanism determining...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010323894
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Would you mind if I get more? An experimental study of the envy game
Casal, Sandro; Güth, Werner; Jia, Mofei; Ploner, Matteo - 2011
setting in which there is no conflict in material interests: a proposer, holding the role of residual claimant, chooses the … harms the proposer. Notwithstanding, maximal claims by proposers are predominant for all game types. This generates conflict …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281655
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Would you mind if I get more? An experimental study of the envy game
Casal, Sandro; Güth, Werner; Jia, Mofei; Ploner, Matteo - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 84 (2012) 3, pp. 857-865
setting in which there is no conflict in material interests: a proposer, holding the role of residual claimant, chooses the … harms the proposer. Notwithstanding, maximal claims by proposers are predominant for all game types. This generates conflict …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011048077
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Would You Mind if I Get More? An Experimental Study of the Envy Game
Casal, Sandro; Güth, Werner; Jia, Mofei; Ploner, Matteo - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011
setting in which there is no conflict in material interests: a proposer, holding the role of residual claimant, chooses the … harms the proposer. Notwithstanding, maximal claims by proposers are predominant for all game types. This generates conflict …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009358618
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Would you mind if I get more? : an experimental study of the envy game
Casal, Sandro; Güth, Werner; Jia, Mofei; Ploner, Matteo - 2011
setting in which there is no conflict in material interests: a proposer, holding the role of residual claimant, chooses the … harms the proposer. Notwithstanding, maximal claims by proposers are predominant for all game types. This generates conflict … and results in a considerable loss of efficiency. -- Social Preferences ; Conflict ; Experimental Economics ; Bargaining …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009374671
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Procedurally Fair Collective Provision : Its Requirements and Experimental Functionality
Güth, Werner - 2014
This paper derives and justifies a procedurally fair bidding mechanism and reviews experiments that apply the mechanism to public projects provision. In the experiments, not all parties benefit from provision, and the projects' costs can be negative. The experimental results indicate that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013060963
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Procedurally fair collective provision : its requirements and experimental functionality
Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut; Koukoumelis, Anastasios; … - 2013
This paper derives and justifies a procedurally fair bidding mechanism and reviews experiments that apply the mechanism to public projects provision. In the experiments, not all parties benefit from provision, and the projects ́costs can be negative. The experimental results indicate that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010223369
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Procedurally fair collective provision : its requirements and experimental functionality
Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut; Koukoumelis, Anastasios; … - 2013
This paper derives and justifies a procedurally fair bidding mechanism and reviews experiments that apply the mechanism to public projects provision. In the experiments, not all parties benefit from provision, and the projects ́costs can be negative. The experimental results indicate that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009792166