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We experimentally analyze leading by example in a public goods game with two permanent and two temporary group members. Our results show that leadership when permanent and temporary members interact leads to lower contributions than interaction without leadership.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012137180
We experimentally analyze leading by example in a public goods game with two permanent and two temporary group members. Our results show that leadership when permanent and temporary members interact leads to lower contributions than interaction without leadership.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012126333
individual contributions and the probability to lose. -- Cumulative Public Goods ; Milestones ; Climate Change ; Experiment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008747599
In a circular neighborhood with each member having a left and a right neighbor, individuals choose two contribution levels, one each for the public good shared with the left, respectively right, neighbor. This allows for general free riders, who do not contribute at all, and general cooperators,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013001453
a non-linear voluntary contribution experiment. We find that, for those conditionally cooperating, both reciprocity and … cooperation. We try to assess the relative importance of three motives - namely reciprocity, inequity aversion, and anchoring - in … reciprocity. In contrast, anchoring plays only a marginal role. Compared to what previously found in linear voluntary contribution …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009313091
reciprocity norm, irrespective of monetary consequences. -- Public good games ; Punishment ; Experiments ; Conditional cooperation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009579905
provision of globally important public goods like the global climate. -- Experiment ; Groups ; Public good ; Spillover Game …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009487801
Similar to Levati and Neugebauer (2001), a clock is used by which participants can vary their individual contributions for voluntarily providing a public good. As time goes by, participants either in(de)crease their contribution gradually or keep it constant. Groups of two poorly and two richly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009620765
Participants in a public goods experiment receive private or common signals regarding the so-called "point of no return …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009388213
public goods with positive externalities. -- Public good ; experiment ; groups ; Spillover Game ; social dilemma …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003952498