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Tournaments and piece rates revisited: A theoretical and experimental study of premium incentives
Güth, Werner; Levínský, René; Pull, Kerstin; Weisel, Ori - 2010
Tournaments represent an increasingly important component of organizational compensation systems. While prior research … focused on fixed-prize tournaments, i.e., on tournaments where the prize or prize sum to be awarded is set in advance, we …-prize tournaments, are based on relative performance, the prize to be awarded is not set in advance but is a function of the firm …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269742
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Tournaments and piece rates revisited : a theoretical and experimental study of output-dependent prize tournaments
Güth, Werner; Levínský, René; Pull, Kerstin; Weisel, Ori - In: Review of economic design : RED 20 (2016) 1, pp. 69-88
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011482541
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Tournaments and Piece Rates Revisited: A Theoretical and Experimental Study of Premium Incentives
Güth, Werner; Levínský, Rene; Pull, Kerstin; Weisel, Ori - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
Tournaments represent an increasingly important component of organizational compensation systems. While prior research … focused on fixed-prize tournaments, i.e., on tournaments where the prize or prize sum to be awarded is set in advance, we …-prize tournaments, are based on relative performance, the prize to be awarded is not set in advance but is a function of the firm …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008511332
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Purely Procedural Preferences - Beyond Procedural Equity and Reciprocity
Chlaß, Nadine; Güth, Werner; Miettinen, Topi - 2016
Most research in economics models agents somehow motivated by outcomes. Here, we model agents motivated by procedures instead, where procedures are defined independently of an outcome. To that end, we design procedures which yield the same expected outcomes or carry the same information on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012110630
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Ranking alternatives by a fair bidding rule: A theoretical and experimental analysis
Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria; Montinari, Natalia - 2012
We introduce a procedurally fair rule to study a situation where people disagree about the value of three alternatives in the way captured by the voting paradox. The rule allows people to select a final collective ranking by submitting a bid vector with six components (the six possible rankings...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281630
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Ranking alternatives by a fair bidding rule : a theoretical and experimental analysis
Güth, Werner; Levati, Vittoria M.; Montinari, Natalia - 2012
We introduce a procedurally fair rule to study a situation where people disagree about the value of three alternatives in the way captured by the voting paradox. The rule allows people to select a final collective ranking by submitting a bid vector with six components (the six possible rankings...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009500726
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Ranking alternatives by a fair bidding rule: a theoretical and experimental analysis
Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria; Montinari, Natalia - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
We introduce a procedurally fair rule to study a situation where people disagree about the value of three alternatives in the way captured by the voting paradox. The rule allows people to select a final collective ranking by submitting a bid vector with six components (the six possible rankings...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009492965
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Ranking alternatives by a fair bidding rule: A theoretical and experimental analysis
Güth, Werner; Vittoria Levati, M.; Montinari, Natalia - In: European Journal of Political Economy 34 (2014) C, pp. 206-221
We apply a procedurally fair rule to a situation where people disagree about the value of three alternatives in the way captured by the voting paradox. The rule allows people to select a final collective ranking by submitting a bid vector with six components (the six possible rankings of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011056275
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Intrafirm conflicts and interfirm competition
Güth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred - 2011
We study strategic interfirm competition allowing for internal conflicts in each seller firm. Intrafirm conflicts are captured by a multi-agent framework with principals implementing a revenue sharing scheme. For a given number of agents, interfirm competition leads to a higher revenue share for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010305874
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Delegation, worker compensation, and strategic competition
Güth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred - 2014
We study interfirm competition on a product market where effort decisions are delegated to the firms' workers. Intrafirm organization is captured by a principal-multiagent framework where firm owners implement alternative compensation schemes for the workers. We show that the value of delegation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010330371