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Private information, risk aversion, and the evolution of market research

Güth, Sandra; Güth, Werner; Müller, Wieland - 2000

On a homogeneous oligopoly market informed sellers are fully aware of market demand whereas uninformed sellers only know the distribution. We first derive the market results when sellers are risk averse, similarly to Ponssard (1979) who assumed risk neutrality throughout. With the help of these...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612010

Compulsory disclosure of private information theoretical and experimental results for the acquiring-a-company game

Güth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred - 2014

Based on the "acquiring-a-company" game of Samuelson and Bazerman (1985), we theoretically and experimentally analyze the acquisition of a firm. Thereby we compare cases of symmetrically and asymmetrically informed buyers and sellers. This setting allows us to predict and test the effects of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240604

Compulsory disclosure of private information : theoretical and experimental results for the "Acquiring-a-Company" game

Güth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred; Zaby, … - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010253149

Compulsory disclosure of private information : theoretical and experimental results for the "acquiring-a-company" game ; conference paper

Güth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred; Zaby, … - 2014

Based on the acquiring-a-company game of Samuelson and Bazerman (1985), we theoretically and experimentally analyze the acquisition of a firm. Thereby we compare cases of symmetrically and asymmetrically informed buyers and sellers. This setting allows us to predict and test the effects of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010487717

Transparency in Information Acquisition : A Bargaining Experiment

Gehrig, Thomas; Güth, Werner; Levinsky, Rene - 2006

We analyze how transparency affects information acquisition in a bargaining context, where proposers may chose to purchase information about the unknown outside option of their bargaining partner. Although information acquisition is excessive in all our scenarios we find that the bargaining...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014056577

Sorting via screening versus signaling : a theoretic and experimental comparison

Güth, Werner; Winter, Fabian - 2013

capture the structural difference of screening and signaling only via their payoff specification. The experiment thus relies … equilibrium play due to sorting under signaling, compared to screening, is predicted and confirmed experimentally. -- off …-equilibrium play ; screening ; signaling ; sorting ; wage bargaining …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009736798

Sorting Via Screening Versus Signaling : A Theoretic and Experimental Comparison

Güth, Werner; Winter, Fabian - 2013

capture the structural difference of screening and signaling only via their payoff specification. The experiment thus relies … on the same verbal instructions. Although the equilibrium outcomes coincide, greater e fficiency of screening, compared …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014039063