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Determinants of in-group bias: group affiliation or guilt-aversion?
Güth, Werner; Ploner, Matteo; Regner, Tobias - 2008
In-group favoritism in social dilemma situations is one of the main findings of studies in Social Identity Theory. We investigate what causes the in-group bias: is it due to mere group affiliation or, alternatively, is guilt-aversion a possible explanation? We induce group membership in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263886
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The provision of public goods with positive group interdependencies
Güth, Werner; Sääksvuori, Lauri - 2010
efficiency. We find that the observed behavior is primarily determined by an imperfect conditional cooperation that prioritizes …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267122
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The Provision of Public Goods with Positive Group Interdependencies
Güth, Werner; Sääksvuori, Lauri - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
efficiency. We find that the observed behavior is primarily determined by an imperfect conditional cooperation that prioritizes …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008472642
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Determinants of In-group Bias: Group Affiliation or Guilt-aversion?
Güth, Werner; Ploner, Matteo; Regner, Tobias - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008
In-group favoritism in social dilemma situations is one of the main findings of studies in Social Identity Theory. We investigate what causes the in-group bias: is it due to mere group affiliation or, alternatively, is guilt-aversion a possible explanation? We induce group membership in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090588
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Motives of sanctioning : equity and emotions in a public good experiment with punishment
Crosetto, Paolo; Güth, Werner; Mittone, Luigi; Ploner, … - 2012
We study conditional cooperation based on a sequential two-person linear public good game in which a trusting first … conditions of a strong norm of conditional cooperation. Punishment is generally low, it is higher when not delayed and it is not … reciprocity norm, irrespective of monetary consequences. -- Public good games ; Punishment ; Experiments ; Conditional cooperation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009579905
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Leadership in a Public Goods Experiment with Permanent and Temporary Members
Angelova, Vera; Güth, Werner; Kocher, Martin G. - 2019
We experimentally analyze leading by example in a public goods game with two permanent and two temporary group members. Our results show that leadership when permanent and temporary members interact leads to lower contributions than interaction without leadership.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012214197
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Leadership in a public goods experiment with permanent and temporary members
Angelova, Vera; Güth, Werner; Kocher, Martin - 2019
We experimentally analyze leading by example in a public goods game with two permanent and two temporary group members. Our results show that leadership when permanent and temporary members interact leads to lower contributions than interaction without leadership.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012290333
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Leadership in a public goods : experiment with permanent and temporary members
Angelova, Vera; Güth, Werner; Kocher, Martin - 2019
We experimentally analyze leading by example in a public goods game with two permanent and two temporary group members. Our results show that leadership when permanent and temporary members interact leads to lower contributions than interaction without leadership.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012137180
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Leadership in a public goods experiment with permanent and temporary members
Angelova, Vera; Güth, Werner; Kocher, Martin - 2019
We experimentally analyze leading by example in a public goods game with two permanent and two temporary group members. Our results show that leadership when permanent and temporary members interact leads to lower contributions than interaction without leadership.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012126333
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Going on the long race? Employment duration and (de)regulation of experimental stochastic labor markets
Berninghaus, Siegfried K.; Bleich, Sabrina; Güth, Werner - 2009
If the future market wage is uncertain, engaging in long-term employment is risky, with the risk depending on how regulated the labor market is. In our experiment long-term employment can result either from offering long-term contracts or from repeatedly and mutually opting for rematching....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010271794