In a capacity-then-price-setting game we experimentally identify capacity precommitment, the possibility to communicate … before price choices, and prior competition experience as crucial factors for collusive pricing. The theoretical analysis … reveals that such intra-play communication after capacity but before price choices has a collusive effect only for capacity …

allows for preemption in capacity as well as in price determination. Since preemption means to decide before the random …

In a capacity-then-price-setting game we experimentally identify capacity precommitment, the possibility to communicate … before price choices, and prior competition experience as crucial factors for collusive pricing. The theoretical analysis … reveals that such intra-play communication after capacity but before price choices has a collusive effect only for capacity …

allows for preemption in "capacity" as well as in price determination. Since preemption means to decide before the random …

We study price competition in heterogeneous markets where price decisions are delegated to agents. Principals implement … a revenue sharing scheme to which agents react by commonly charging a sales price. The results of our model exemplify … the importance of both intrafirm- and interfirm interactions of principals and agents in competition. We show that price …