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Comparing the effectiveness of collusion devices in first-price procurement : an auction experiment

Brosig-Koch, Jeannette; Güth, Werner; Weiland, Torsten - In: Evolutionary and institutional economics review 13 (2016) 2, pp. 269-295

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011581455

Collusion mechanisms in procurement auctions: An experimental investigation

Güth, Werner; Brosig, Jeannette; Weiland, Torsten - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft - 2006

Collusive agreements are often observed in procurement auctions. They are probably more easily achieved when … formation is difficult to realize. We compare experimentally different coordination mechanisms in a first-price procurement … opportunity to implement mutual shareholding. According to our results firstprice procurement is quite collusion-proof when …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765106

Collusion mechanisms in procurement auctions:An experimental investigation

Brosig, Jeannette; Güth, Werner; Weiland, Torsten - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2006

Collusive agreements are often observed in procurement auctions. They are probablymore easily achieved when competitors …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866708

Does procedural fairness crowd out other-regarding concerns? A bidding experiment

Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria; Ploner, Matteo - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

Bidding rules that guarantee procedural fairness may induce more equilibrium bidding and moderate other-regarding concerns. In our experiment, we assume commonly known true values and only two bidders to implement a best-case scenario for other-regarding concerns. The two-by-two factorial design...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008670333

Endogenous community formation and collective provision – A procedurally fair mechanism

Güth, Werner - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 108 (2014) C, pp. 389-395

A group of actors, individuals or firms, can engage in collectively providing projects which may be costly or generating revenues and which may benefit some and harm others. Based on requirements of procedural fairness, we derive a bidding mechanism determining endogenously who participates in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011116861

Rules (of Bidding) to Generate Equal Stated Profits: An Axiomatic Approach

Güth, Werner - In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) 167 (2011) 4, pp. 608-612

Although one may hope to achieve equality of stated profits without enforcing it, one may not trust in such voluntary equality seeking and rather try to impose rules (of bidding) guaranteeing it. Our axiomatic approach is based on envy-free net trades according to bids, which, together with the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009421918

Endogenous Community Formation and Collective Provision - A Procedurally Fair Mechanism

Güth, Werner - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

A group of actors, individuals or firms, can engage in collectively providing projects which may be costly or generating revenues and which may benefit some and harm others. Based on requirements of procedural fairness (Güth and Kliemt, 2013), we derive a bidding mechanism determining...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010631674

Auctions and Leaks: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation

Fischer, Sven; Güth, Werner; Kaplan, Todd R.; Ro'i Zultan - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

We study first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding where second movers may discover the first movers bids. There is a unique equilibrium in the first-price auction and multiple equilibria in the second-price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010961052

Does Procedural Fairness Crowd Out Other-Regarding Concerns? A Bidding Experiment

Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria; Ploner, Matteo - In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) 169 (2013) 3, pp. 433-450

Bidding rules that guarantee procedural fairness may induce more equilibrium bidding and moderate other-regarding concerns. Here, we investigate procedural fairness as in Güth (2011). In our experiment, we assume commonly known true values and only two bidders to implement a best-case scenario...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010903173

Learning to bid: An experimental study of bid function adjustments in auctions and fair division games

Güth, Werner; Ivanova, Radosveta; Königstein, Manfred; … - Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und … - 1999

We examine learning behavior in auctions and Fair division games with independent private values under two different price rules, first and second price. Participants face these four games repeatedly and submit complete bid functions rather than single bids. This allows us to examine whether...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010983519