Most analyses of banking crises assume that banks use real contracts. However, in practice, contracts are nominal and this is what is assumed here. We consider a standard banking model with aggregate return risk, aggregate liquidity risk and idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. We show that, with...

Before the crisis, bank regulation relied to a large extent on capital regulation. Liquidity regulation was not widely used. The liquidity problems during the crisis led to calls for liquidity regulation. As a result, the Basel III accord introduced global liquidity standards. An important issue...

Competition policy in the banking sector is complicated by the necessity of maintaining financial stability. Greater competition may be good for (static) efficiency, but bad for financial stability. From the point of view of welfare economics, the relevant question is: What are the efficient...

The term corporate governance is used in two distinct ways. In Anglo-Saxon countries like the US and UK good corporate governance involves firms pursuing the interests of shareholders. In other countries like Japan, Germany and France it involves pursuing the interests of all stakeholders...

Capital adequacy regulation is often justified, directly or indirectly, by an appeal to the need to prevent financial crises. By contrast, we argue that, in the absence of a welfare-relevant pecuniary externality, banks will choose the socially optimal capital structure themselves, without...

The effect of stock market interlinkages on asset price bubbles are considered. Bubbles can occur when there is an agency problem between banks and the people they lend money to because the banks cannot observe how the funds are invested. This causes a risk shifting problem and asset prices are...

A complex financial system comprises both financial markets and financial institutions. Financial institutions can take the form of intermediaries or banks. Bank-based financial systems unlike intermediary-based systems, are subject to crises, but crises do not imply market failure. We show that...

Bubbles where asset prices rise and then collapse are often followed by financial crises where default is widespread. A simple theory of bubbles based on an agency problem is developed. Investors use money borrowed from banks to invest. Risky assets are relatively attractive because investors...

Empirical evidence suggests that banking panics are a natural outgrowth of the business cycle. In other words panics are not simply the result of quot;sunspotsquot; or self-fulfilling prophecies. Panics occur when depositors perceive that the returns on the bank's assets are going to be...