We examine coordinated effects of mergers in the Swedish retail market for gasoline during the period 1986-2002. Despite significant changes in market concentration and many factors conductive to coordination, the empirical analysis shows that the level of coordination is low. In addition,...

We investigate the feasibility of horizontal mergers in a homogeneous triopoly where firms compete in quantities and production is polluting the environment. We show that the degree of alignment between private and social incentives increases in the intensity of pollution

We investigate the possibility of using public firms to regulate polluting emissions in a Cournot oligopoly where production takes place at constant returns to scale and entails a negative environmental externality. We model the problem as a differential game and investigate (i) the Cournot-Nash...

We want to take a differential game approach with price dynamics to conduct an investigation into the consequences of horizontal merger of firms where the demand function is nonlinear. We take into consideration the open-loop equilibrium. We show that in relation to the fact that the demand is...

We determine the emergence of the Porter Hypothesis in a large oligopoly setting where the industry-wide adoption of green technologies is endogenously determined as a result of competition among coalitions. We examine a setting where the initial technology is polluting, firms decide whether to...

This paper offers an overview of the literature discussing oligopoly games in which polluti ng emissions are generated by the supply of goods requiring a natural resource as an input. An analytical summary of the main features of the interplay between pollution and resource extraction is then...

This paper investigates the relationship between trade liberalisation, consumers' environmental awareness and a negative environmental externality in consumption. We adopt an international Hotelling duopoly setup, where firms are located in two asymmetric countries. We find that, if the...

We investigate the possibility of using public firms to regulate polluting emissions in a Cournot oligopoly where production takes place at constant returns to scale and entails a negative environmental externality. We model the problem as a differential game and investigate (i) the Cournot-Nash...

I characterise the subgame perfect equilibrium of a differential market game with hyperbolic demand where firms are quantity-setters and accumulate capacity over time à la Ramsey. I show that the open-loop solution is subgame perfect. Then, I analyse the feasibility of horizontal mergers, and...