When second-price auctions have been conducted in the laboratory, most of the observed bids have been “overbids†(bids that exceed the bidder’s value) and there are very few underbids. Few if any of the subjects in those experiments had any prior experience bidding in auctions....

The experimental economics literature on second-price sealed-bid private value auctions has established that subjects typically bid more than their value, despite the fact that value bidding is a dominant strategy in such auctions. Moreover, the laboratory evidence shows that subjects do not...

This paper contributes to the literature on second-price auctions with resale. We add speculators—bidders with value zero—to the standard symmetric independent private values environment. There always exists a continuum of inefficient equilibria that are profitable for a...

In nonconvex environments, a sunspot equilibrium can sometimes be destroyed by the introduction of new extrinsic information. We provide a simple test for determining whether or not a particular equilibrium survives, or is robust to, all possible re…nements of the state space. We use this...

Gender differences in "competitiveness," previously documented in laboratory experiments, are hypothesized to play a role in a wide array of economic outcomes. The current paper provides evidence of competition-aversion in a natural setting somewhere between the simplicity of a laboratory...

Transplants of donated stem cells save the lives of many patients with blood diseases. Donation is somewhat painful, but rarely has lasting adverse effects. Patients can accept transplants only from donors with compatible immune systems. Those lacking a sibling match must seek donations from the...

A scenerio is provided in which a house in Eden Mills, Ontario is a Giffen good. The conditions derived in the example apply to other indivisible goods as well. Journal of Economic Literature classification number: D11.