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Holdouts induce lower wage increases if new contracts are backdated
Houba, Harold; Bolt, Wilko - 1996
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000934398
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Strategic wage setting and coordination frictions with multiple applications
Gautier, Pieter; Moraga-González, José Luis - 2004
We examine wage competition in a model where identical workers choose the number of jobs to apply for and identical firms simultaneously post a wage. The Nash equilibrium of this game exhibits the following properties: (i) an equilibrium where workers apply for just one job exhibits unemployment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335208
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Intra firm bargaining and shapley values
Bruegemann, Bjoern; Gautier, Pieter; Menzio, Guido - 2018
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011819306
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Intra firm bargaining and shapley values
Bruegemann, Bjoern; Gautier, Pieter; Menzio, Guido - 2015
The paper revisits the problem of wage bargaining between a firm and multiple workers. We show that the Subgame Perfect … coincides with the Shapley values as claimed in their classic paper. We propose an alternative extensive-form bargaining game …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011317659
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Intra firm bargaining and shapley values
Bruegemann, Bjoern; Gautier, Pieter; Menzio, Guido - 2015
The paper revisits the problem of wage bargaining between a firm and multiple workers. We show that the Subgame Perfect … coincides with the Shapley values as claimed in their classic paper. We propose an alternative extensive-form bargaining game …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011327338
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Strategic wage setting and coordination frictions with multiple applications
Gautier, Pieter; Moraga-González, José Luis - 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002128050
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Strategic wage setting and coordination frictions with multiple applications
Gautier, Pieter (contributor);  … - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002226767
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Strategic wage setting and coordination frictions with multiple applications
Gautier, Pieter (contributor);  … - 2004
We examine wage competition in a model where identical workers choose the number of jobs to apply for and identical firms simultaneously post a wage. The Nash equilibrium of this game exhibits the following properties: (i) an equilibrium where workers apply for just one job exhibits unemployment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002514786
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On-the-job search and sorting
Gautier, Pieter; Teulings, Coen N.; Vuuren, Aico van - 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003311113
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On-the-job search and sorting
Gautier, Pieter (contributor); Teulings, Coen N. (contributor) - 2005
We characterize the equilibrium of a search model with a continuum of job and worker types, wage bargaining, free entry …' bargaining power resolves this inefficiency. Unemployment benefits are a second best alternative to this policy. We establish …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003155785