Showing 1 - 10 of 142
Theory points to a potential trade-off between two main school assignment mechanisms; Boston and Deferred Acceptance … (DA). While DA is strategy-proof and gives a stable matching, Boston might outperform DA in terms of ex-ante efficiency …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011283122
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We investigate the effect of search frictions on labor market sorting by constructing a model which is in line with recent evidence that employers collect a pool of applicants before interviewing a subset of them. In this environment, we derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for sorting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012581332
We investigate the effect of search frictions on labor market sorting by constructing a model which is in line with recent evidence that employers collect a pool of applicants before interviewing a subset of them. In this environment, we derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for sorting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012583359
when locations are similar (in which case the aggregate matching function is urn-ball) but that quality weighted trade can …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014494103
when locations are similar (in which case the aggregate matching function is urn-ball) but that quality weighted trade can …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014496539
when locations are similar (in which case the aggregate matching function is urn-ball) but that quality weighted trade can …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014486804
In a market in which sellers compete for heterogeneous buyers by posting mechanisms, we analyze how the properties of the meeting technology affect the allocation of buyers to sellers. We show that a separate submarket for each type of buyer is the efficient outcome if and only if meetings are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011476548
In a market in which sellers compete for heterogeneous buyers by posting mechanisms, we analyze how the properties of the meeting technology affect the allocation of buyers to sellers. We show that a separate submarket for each type of buyer is the efficient outcome if and only if meetings are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011479787