type="main" <p>We study the interaction between a group of agents who exert effort to complete a project and a manager who chooses its objectives. The manager has limited commitment power so that she can commit to the objectives only when the project is sufficiently close to completion. We show...</p>

We study the interaction between a group of agents who exert costly effort over time to complete a project, and a manager who chooses the objectives that must be met in order for her to sign off on it. The manager has limited commitment power so that she can commit to the requirements only when...

We consider a two-player game of war of attrition under complete information. It is well- known that this class of games admits equilibria in pure, as well as mixed strategies, and much of the literature has focused on the latter. We show that if the players' payoffs whilst in “war” vary...

When operating in a market with heterogeneous customers, a service firm (e.g., a car rental company or a hotel) needs to manage its capacity so as to maximize its revenue. To gauge the potential demand, a service firm often allows each customer to reserve a unit of service in advance. However,...

In this chapter we study a team dynamic problem in which a group of agents collaborate over time to complete a project. The project progresses at a rate that depends on the agents' efforts, and it generates a payoff upon completion. First, we show that agents work harder the closer the project...

When operating in a market with heterogeneous customers, a service firm (e.g., a car rental company or a hotel) needs to manage its capacity so as to maximize its revenue. To gauge the potential demand, a service firm often allows each customer to reserve a unit of service in advance. However,...