We examine whether it is socially beneficial for the individual voting records of central bank council members to be published when the general public is unsure about central bankers' efficiency and central bankers are aiming for re-election. We show that publication is initially harmful since...

This paper examines whether it is socially desirable for the individual voting records of central bank council members to be published when central bankers' ; preferences differ. We show that the misrepresentation of their preferences is not advantageous for central bankers although central...

In this paper we study how promoting product market competition by reducing mark-ups or by increasing productivity are able to complement labor market reforms. We use a simple general equilibrium model with different types of labor. The bottom-line of the paper is that product market reforms...

We examine wage bargaining when employers and labor unions do not always take all general equilibrium effects into account but learn a steady state. If agents do hardly consider general equilibrium effects, low real wages and low unemployment results. With an intermediate view, when partial...

We examine how globalization affects firms incentives to train workers. In our model, firms invest in productivity-enhancing worker training before Cournot competition takes place. When two separated product markets become integrated and are thus replaced with a market with greater demand and...