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Minority Voting and Public Project Provision

Gersbach, Hans - 2007

voting and outline our research program. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010295228

Minority voting and public project provision

Gersbach, Hans - In: Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal 3 (2009) 2009-35, pp. 1-40

voting and simple majority voting and outline the research program. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010299169

Taxation, Innovation and Entrepreneurship

Schetter, Ulrich; Gersbach, Hans; Schneider, Maik - 2013

We examine how basic research should be financed. While basic research is a public good benefiting innovating … shareholders, and aggregate output. We show that the general economy impact of basic research rationalizes a pecking order of … taxation to finance basic research. In particular, in a society with desirable dense entrepreneurial activity, a large share of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010329310

Democratic provision of divisible public goods

Gersbach, Hans - 2010

In this paper we examine the potential of democratic constitutions for the provision of divisible public goods in a large economy. Our main insights are as follows: When aggregate shocks are absent, the combination of the following rules yields first-best allocations: a supermajority rule, equal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266097

Information Aggregation in Democratic Mechanisms

Britz, Volker; Gersbach, Hans - 2016

We examine whether and how democratic procedures can achieve socially desirable public good provision in the presence of profound uncertainty about the benefits of public goods, i.e., when citizens are able to identify the distribution of benefits only if they aggregate their private...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011451437

Constitutional Design: Separation of Financing and Project Decision

Gersbach, Hans; Hahn, Volker; Imhof, Stephan - 2009

We examine the provision of public projects under separate tax and subsidy rules. We find that tax rules separated from project cum subsidy decisions exhibit several advantages when incentive problems of the agenda-setter are taken into account. In particular, tax rules may prevent the proposal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753173

Experimentation in Democratic Mechanisms

Britz, Volker; Gersbach, Hans - 2014

We examine whether and how democratic procedures can achieve socially desirable public good provision in the presence of deep uncertainty about the benefits of the public good, i.e., when citizens are able to identify the distribution of benefits only if they aggregate their private information....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753263

Taxation, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship

Gersbach, Hans; Schetter, Ulrich; Schneider, Maik T. - 2014

We explore optimal and politically feasible growth policies in the form of basic research investments and taxation …. Basic research is a public good that benefits innovating entrepreneurs, but its provision and financing also affect the … show that the impact of basic research on the general economy rationalizes a taxation pecking order to finance basic …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753270

Democratic Mechanisms: Double Majority Rules and Flexible Agenda Costs

Gersbach, Hans - 2002

We introduce democratic mechanisms where individual utilities are not observable by other people at the legislative stage. We show that the combination of three rules can yield e±cient provision of public projects: first, flexible and double majority rules where the size of the majority depends...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315456

Minority voting and public project provision

Gersbach, Hans - 2009

voting and simple majority voting and outline the research program. -- Democratic constitutions ; minority voting ; public …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003881290