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Gersbach, Hans; Schneider, Maik T. - In: European Economic Review 56 (2012) 7, pp. 1461-1479

In this paper we examine the impact of tax contracts as a novel institution on elections, policies, and welfare. We consider a political game in which three parties compete to form the government and voters may behave strategically. Parties have policy preferences about the level of public-good...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010580679

Information Markets, Elections and Contracts

Gersbach, Hans; Müller, Markus - CESifo - 2011

problem, we introduce a triple mechanism involving political information markets, reelection threshold contracts, and … democratic elections. An information market is used to predict the long-term performance of a policy, while threshold contracts … stipulate a price level on the political information market that a politician must reach to have the right to stand for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008833887

A Theory of Threshold Contracts

Becker, Johannes Gerd; Gersbach, Hans - CER-ETH Center of Economic Research, Department of … - 2013

We consider an innitely repeated reappointment game in a principal- agent relationship. Typical examples are voter-politician or government- public servant relationships. The agent chooses costly effort and enjoys being in office until he is deselected. The principal observes a noisy signal of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010900154

Higher Bars for Incumbents and Experience

Gersbach, Hans; Müller, Markus - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

This paper analyzes optimal re-election bars when incumbents gain socially valuable experience in office. We develop a two-period model in which the output of a public good depends on an office-holder's effort, ability and experience. When campaigning for election to an open seat in the first...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083310

Assessment Voting

Gersbach, Hans - CER-ETH Center of Economic Research, Department of … - 2015

In this paper, we present a new way to deal with initiatives, i.e. proposals that can be submitted to voting by the citizens of a democracy. We call it “Assessment Voting”. It takes place in two rounds. Before the conclusive voting, a given number of randomly-chosen voters casts its votes....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011274529

Information markets, elections and contracts

Gersbach, Hans; Müller, Markus - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274852

Incentive pay for policy-makers?

Britz, Volker; Ebrahimi, Afsoon; Gersbach, Hans - 2018

We study how to efficiently motivate policy-makers to solve political multitask problems. Political multi-task problems typically have outcomes that are difficult to measure. Moreover, there are conflicts among citizens about optimal policies and the agents have the power to tax the citizens to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011985389

Reelection Threshold Contracts in Politics

Gersbach, Hans; Liessem, Verena - 2001

When politicians are provided with insufficient incentives by the democratic election mechanism, we show that social welfare can be improved by threshold contracts. A threshold incentive contract stipulates a performance level which a politican must reach in order to have the right to stand for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315424

Elections, Contracts and Markets

Gersbach, Hans; Müller, Markus - 2006

. To solve this problem, we propose a triple mechanism involving political information markets, reelection threshold … contracts, and democratic elections. An information market is used to predict the long-term performance of a policy, while … threshold contracts stipulate a price level on the political information market that a politician must reach to have the right …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753121

Tax Contracts and Elections

Gersbach, Hans; Schneider, Maik T. - 2009

In this paper we examine the impact of tax contracts as a novel institution on elections, policies, and welfare. We consider a political game in which three parties compete to form the government. Parties have policy preferences about the level of public-good provision and benefit from perks...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753187