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Information markets, elections and contracts

Gersbach, Hans; Müller, Markus - 2011

problem, we introduce a triple mechanism involving political information markets, reelection threshold contracts, and … democratic elections. An information market is used to predict the long-term performance of a policy, while threshold contracts … stipulate a price level on the political information market that a politician must reach to have the right to stand for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009009663

Competition of politicians for incentive contracts and elections

Gersbach, Hans - 2001

When politicians have lower discount factors than voters, democratic elections cannot sufficiently motivate politicians to undertake long-term socially beneficial projects. When politicians can offer incentive contracts which become effective upon reelection, the hierarchy of contracts and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011397764

Reelection threshold contracts in politics

Gersbach, Hans - 2001

When politicians are provided with insufficient incentives by the democratic election mechanism, we show that social welfare can be improved by threshold contracts. A threshold incentive contract stipulates a performance level which a politican must reach in order to have the right to stand for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011408440

Information Markets, Elections and Contracts

Gersbach, Hans - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013130416

Sophisticated Attacks on Decoy Ballots : A Devil's Menu

Gersbach, Hans - 2019

Voting systems based on decoy ballots aim at preventing real ballots from being bought. Decoy ballots do not count in election outcomes, but are indistinguishable from real ballots. We introduce a “Devil's Menu” consisting of several price offers and allocation rules, which can be used by a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012900417

Incentive Pay for Policy-makers?

Britz, Volker - 2019

We study how to efficiently motivate policy-makers to solve political multitask problems. Political multi-task problems typically have outcomes that are difficult to measure. Moreover, there are conflicts among citizens about optimal policies and the agents have the power to tax the citizens to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012896451

Coalition-Preclusion Contracts and Moderate Policies

Gersbach, Hans - 2014

We examine the effects of a novel political institution, which we call Coalition-Preclusion Contracts, on elections, policies, and welfare. Coalition-Preclusion Contracts enable political parties to credibly commit before the elections not to form a coalition after the elections with one or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013054797

A Reform Dilemma in Polarized Democracies

Gersbach, Hans - 2016

We study the feasibility and efficiency of policy reforms in polarized democracies. We develop a simple election model where (i) reforms are costly for voters and politicians and these costs increase with the extent of policy change, and (ii) politicians differ in their ability to carry out...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012985780

Lean IRB Approaches and Transition Design : The Basel Ii Proposal

Gersbach, Hans - 2002

The internal ratings based approach (IRB) of the Basel Committee has three problems: few incentives for banks to adopt the IRB approach, a complicated technical framework and very conservative aggregation rules. We suggest the following remedies: First, we suggest a new design of transition...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012741736

A theory of threshold contracts

Becker, Johannes Gerd; Gersbach, Hans - 2013 - This version: August 2013

We consider an in nitely repeated reappointment game in a principal- agent relationship. Typical examples are voter-politician or government- public servant relationships. The agent chooses costly effort and enjoys being in office until he is deselected. The principal observes a noisy signal of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010221102