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Communication under Ambiguity
Dominiak, Adam; Gersbach, Hans - 2024
We study communication in ambiguous environments. Agents communicate individual decisions sequentially. Based on the …, the decisions differ no matter how long the communication lasts. Such persistent disagreements are precluded in Bayesian … frameworks endowed with a common prior. When communication is private and nobody is excluded from it, we show that ambiguity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014484275
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Voting transparency and conflicting interests in central bank councils
Gersbach, Hans; Hahn, Volker - 2001
This paper examines whether it is socially desirable for the individual voting records of central bank council members to be published when central bankers' preferences differ. We show that the misrepresentation of their preferences is not advantageous for central bankers although central...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011419124
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Voting transparency, conflicting interest, and the appointment of central bankers
Gersbach, Hans; Hahn, Volker - In: Economics & politics 16 (2004) 3, pp. 321-345
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002388984
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Voting transparency and conflicting interests in central bank councils
Gersbach, Hans; Hahn, Volker - 2001
This paper examines whether it is socially desirable for the individual voting records of central bank council members to be published when central bankers' ; preferences differ. We show that the misrepresentation of their preferences is not advantageous for central bankers although central...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001558069
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Voting transparency in a monetary union
Gersbach, Hans; Hahn, Volker - In: Journal of money, credit and banking : JMCB 41 (2009) 5, pp. 831-853
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003878604
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Voting transparency in a monetary union
Gersbach, Hans; Hahn, Volker - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013424654
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Campaigns, Political Mobility, and Communication
Gersbach, Hans - 2011
We present a model of elections in which interest group donations allow candidates to shift policy positions. We show that if donations were prohibited, then a unique equilibrium regarding the position choices of candidates would exist. With unrestricted financing of political campaigns two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013127785
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Reelection threshold contracts in politics
Gersbach, Hans; Liessem, Verena - In: Social choice and welfare 31 (2008) 2, pp. 233-255
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003741232
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Incentive contracts and elections for politicians with multi-task problems
Gersbach, Hans; Liessem, Verena - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 68 (2008) 2, pp. 401-411
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003789654
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Campaigns, political mobility, and communication
Gersbach, Hans - 2009
We present a model of elections in which interest group donations allow candidates to shift policy positions. We show that if donations were prohibited, then a unique equilibrium regarding the platform choices of candidates would exist. Our game with financing of political campaigns exhibits two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003897539