Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 468
Cover Image
Raising juveniles
Bell, Clive; Gersbach, Hans; Schneider, Maik T. - 2010
This paper investigates how families make decisions about the education of juveniles. The decision problem is analyzed in three variations: a 'decentralized' scheme, in which the parents control the purse-strings, but the children dispose of their time as they see fit; a 'hierarchical' scheme,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003985749
Cover Image
Raising juveniles
Bell, Clive; Gersbach, Hans; Schneider, Maik T. - 2010
This paper investigates how families make decisions about the education of juveniles. The decision problem is analyzed in three variations: a 'decentralized' scheme, in which the parents control the purse-strings, but the children dispose of their time as they see fit; a 'hierarchical' scheme,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269937
Cover Image
Risk Sharing Capacity : Markets versus Households
Gersbach, Hans - 2014
-space approach of Arrow-Debreu. A host of new interesting economic issues emerge. First, risk averse agents can attempt to insure … an open question. Second, one may ask more specifically what is the role of social groups for risk sharing and risk … allocation when agents face idiosyncratic or aggregate risk. Third, does a suitable combination of social group formation and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013061191
Cover Image
Raising juveniles
Bell, Clive; Gersbach, Hans; Schneider, Maik T. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 32-51
This paper investigates how families decide how juveniles use their time. The problem is analyzed in three variations: (i) a ‘decentralized’ scheme, in which parents control the main budget, but their children dispose of their time as they see fit, together with any earnings from work on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010597545
Cover Image
Raising Juveniles
Bell, Clive; Gersbach, Hans; Schneider, Maik T. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010
This paper investigates how families make decisions about the education of juveniles. The decision problem is analyzed in three variations: a 'decentralized' scheme, in which the parents control the purse-strings, but the children dispose of their time as they see fit; a 'hierarchical' scheme,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008548713
Cover Image
Raising Juveniles
Bell, Clive - 2010
This paper investigates how families make decisions about the education of juveniles. The decision problem is analyzed in three variations: a 'decentralized' scheme, in which the parents control the purse-strings, but the children dispose of their time as they see fit; a 'hierarchical' scheme,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013141231
Cover Image
Contingent contracts in banking : insurance or risk magnification?
Gersbach, Hans - 2021
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012490357
Cover Image
Club theory and household formation
Gersbach, Hans; Haller, Hans - 2009
The relationship between our general equilibrium model with multi- member households and club models with multiple private goods is investigated. The main distinction in the definitions consists of the equilibrium concepts. As a rule, competitive equilibria among households where no group of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008732395
Cover Image
Voice and bargaining power
Gersbach, Hans; Haller, Hans - 2006
We propose a formal concept of the power of voice in the context of a simple model where individuals form groups and trade in competitive markets. Individuals use outside options in two different ways. Actual outside options reflect the possibility to exit or to join other existing groups....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261418
Cover Image
Club Theory and Household Formation
Gersbach, Hans; Haller, Hans - 2009
The relationship between our general equilibrium model with multi- member households and club models with multiple private goods is investigated. The main distinction in the definitions consists of the equilibrium concepts. As a rule, competitive equilibria among house- holds where no group of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753174