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When politicians have lower discount factors than voters, democratic elections cannot sufficiently motivate politicians to undertake long-term socially beneficial projects. When politicians can offer incentive contracts which become effective upon reelection, the hierarchy of contracts and...
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Politicians may pander to public opinion and may renounce undertaking beneficial long-term projects. To alleviate this problem, we introduce a triple mechanism involving political information markets, reelection threshold contracts, and democratic elections. An information market is used to...
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welfare and the lowest polarization levels. We apply our model to the design of optimal re-election hurdles. In particular, we … show that raising the vote-share needed for re-election above 50% weakly reduces policy polarization and tends to increase … welfare. Furthermore, we identify circumstances where the optimal re-election hurdle is strictly larger than 50% …
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When politicians are provided with insufficient incentives by the democratic election mechanism, we show that social …
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