Often political races are not really competitive, and the path to reelection is smooth for many incumbents. In two-candidate races for office we suggest the introduction of a new re-election rule, which we call the “Score-replication Rule.” This rule requires that, to be reelected, any...

We outline a new voting procedure for representative democracies. This procedure should be used for important decisions only and consists of two voting rounds: a randomly-selected subset of the citizens is awarded a one-time voting right. The parliament also votes, and the two decisions are...

The election mechanism has difficulties in selecting the most able candidates and deselecting less able ones. In a simple model we explore how the power of elections as a selection device can be improved by requiring higher vote thresholds than 50% for incumbents.

German Abstract: In diesem Beitrag wird eine neue Idee für den Umgang mit Volksinitiativen vorgestellt. Vor einer endgültigen Abstimmung über eine Initiative würde durch eine Abstimmung einer zufällig ausgewählten Stichprobe von Bürgern ein vorläufiges Ergebnis festgestellt. Die...

We outline a new voting procedure for representative democracies. This procedure should be used for important decisions only and consists of two voting rounds: a randomly-selected subset of the citizens is awarded a one-time voting right. The parliament also votes, and the two decisions are...

A population of identical individuals must choose one of two alternatives under uncer- tainty about what the right alternative is. Individuals can gather information of increasing accuracy at an increasing convex utility cost. For such a setup, we analyze how vote del- egation to a committee and...

Can competing stablecoins produce efficient and stable outcomes? We study competition among stablecoins pegged to a stable currency. They are backed by interest-bearing safe assets and can be redeemed with the issuer or traded in a secondary market. If an issuer sticks to an appropriate...

This paper examines the question to what extent premia for macroeconomic risks inbanking are sufficient to avoid banking crises. We investigate a competitive bankingsystem embedded in an overlapping-generations model subject to repeatedmacroeconomic shocks. We show that even if banks fully...

We examine banking competition when deposit or loan contracts contingent on macroeconomic shocks become feasible. We show that the risk allocation is efficient, provided that banks are not bailed out. In this case, banks may shift part of the risk to depositors. The private sector insures the...

We study the consequences and optimal design of bank deposit insurance in a general equilibrium model. The model involves two production sectors. One sector is financed by issuing bonds to risk-averse households. Firms in the other sector are monitored and financed by banks. Households fund...