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Experimentation in Democratic Mechanisms
Britz, Volker; Gersbach, Hans - CER-ETH Center of Economic Research, Department of … - 2014
. Conversely, we show that standard democratic mechanisms with an arbitrary number of voting rounds but no experimentation do not …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010900152
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Debt-Sensitive Majority Rules
Grimm, Oliver; Becker, Johannes; Gersbach, Hans - 2010
We examine debt-sensitive majority rules. According to such a rule, the higher a planned public debt, the higher the necessary parliamentary majority to approve it. In a two-period model, we compare debt-sensitive majority rules with the simple majority rule when individuals differ regarding...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270120
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Information Aggregation in Democratic Mechanisms
Britz, Volker; Gersbach, Hans - 2016
private information truthfully before voting takes place. Depending on the distance between two feasible public good levels …, the optimal mechanism involves either one or two voting rounds. We show that procedural efficiency cannot be achieved by … communication among all citizens prior to voting. Finally, we outline several applications of the mechanism. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011451437
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Constitutional Design: Separation of Financing and Project Decision
Gersbach, Hans; Hahn, Volker; Imhof, Stephan - 2009
We examine the provision of public projects under separate tax and subsidy rules. We find that tax rules separated from project cum subsidy decisions exhibit several advantages when incentive problems of the agenda-setter are taken into account. In particular, tax rules may prevent the proposal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753173
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Experimentation in Democratic Mechanisms
Britz, Volker; Gersbach, Hans - 2014
. Conversely, we show that standard democratic mechanisms with an arbitrary number of voting rounds but no experimentation do not …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753263
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Constitutional Design: Separation of Financing and Project Decision
Gersbach, Hans; Hahn, Volker; Imhof, Stephan - CER-ETH Center of Economic Research, Department of … - 2009
We examine the provision of public projects under separate tax and subsidy rules. We find that tax rules separated from project cum subsidy decisions exhibit several advantages when incentive problems of the agenda-setter are taken into account. In particular, tax rules may prevent the proposal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005000031
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Tax Rules
Gersbach, Hans; Hahn, Volker; Imhof, Stephan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
We examine the provision of public projects under tax and subsidy rules. We find that tax rules separated from project cum subsidy decisions exhibit several advantages when incentive problems of the agenda-setter are taken into account. In particular, tax rules may prevent the proposal of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468549
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Debt-sensitive Majority Rules
Becker, Johannes Gerd; Gersbach, Hans; Grimm, Oliver - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
We examine debt-sensitive majority rules. According to such a rule, the higher a planned public debt, the higher the parliamentary majority required to approve it. In a two-period model we compare debt-sensitive majority rules with the simple majority rule when individuals differ regarding their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468567
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Tax Contracts and Government Formation
Gersbach, Hans; Schneider, Maik - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
We introduce tax contracts and examine how they affect government formation and welfare of voters in a democracy with proportional elections. A tax contract specifies a range of tax rates a party is committed to if in government. We develop a new model of party competition in which parties...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504289
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Flexible Majority Rules for Central Banks
Gersbach, Hans; Pachl, Bernhard - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
We propose a flexible majority rule for central bank councils where the size of the majority depends monotonically on the change in interest rate within a particular time frame. Small changes in interest rate require a small share of supporting votes, even less than 50%. We show that flexible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067504