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When politicians have lower discount factors than voters, democratic elections cannot sufficiently motivate politicians … to undertake long-term socially beneficial projects. When politicians can offer incentive contracts which become … politicians time preferences. In the non-commitment case, incentive contracts may need to include a golden parachute clause …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011397764
have a down-up characteristic. We show that voters cannot motivate politicians to invest in down-up policies by their … macroeconomic developments. Finally, we comment on practical issues when such contracts are used in election races …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014188188
When politicians are provided with insufficient incentives by the democratic election mechanism, we show that social …. Reelection thresholds can be offered by politicians during campaigns and do not impair the liberal principle of free and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011408440
When politicians are provided with insufficient incentives by the democratic election mechanism, we show that social …. Reelection thresholds can be offered by politicians during campaigns and do not impair the liberal principle of free and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013320698
We consider a model with a politician facing a multi-task problem while in office. The reelection mechanism distorts the allocation of effort in favor of tasks whose outcomes can be measured more precisely than others. We show that a hierarchy of elections and incentive contracts can alleviate...
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We present a model of elections in which interest group donations allow candidates to shift policy positions. We show that if donations were prohibited, then a unique equilibrium regarding the position choices of candidates would exist. With unrestricted financing of political campaigns two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013127785
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As the performance of long-term projects is not observable in the short run politicians may pander to public opinion … to stand for reelection. Reelection thresholds are offered by politicians during campaigns. We show that, on balance, the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003459198