We examine "Forward Guidance Contracts", which make central bankers' utility contingent on the precision of interest-rate forecasts for some time. Such Forward Guidance Contracts are a exible commitment device and can improve economic performance when the economy is stuck in a liquidity trap....

We integrate banks and the coexistence of bank and bond financing into an otherwise standard New Keynesian framework. There are two policy-makers: a central banker, who can decide on short-term nominal interest rates, and a macroprudential policy-maker, who can vary aggregate capital...

We examine to what extent central banks should release their internal assessments concerning the links between money growth and future inflation, and between employment and inflation. We show that the social value of transparency concerning real shocks is negative since the disclosure of the...

We examine “Forward Guidance Contracts”, which make central bankers' utility contingent on the precision of interest-rate forecasts for some time. Such Forward Guidance Contracts are a flexible commitment device and can improve economic performance when the economy is stuck in a liquidity...

We examine whether the publication of the individual voting records of central-bank council members is socially beneficial when the public is unsure about the efficiency of central bankers and central bankers are angling for re-appointment. We show that publication is initially harmful since it...

We suggest that flexible majority rules for currency issuance decisions foster the stability of a cryptocurrency. With flexible majority rules, the voteshare needed to approve a particular currency issuance growth is increasing with this growth rate. By choosing suitable parameters for these...

We propose a flexible majority rule for central bank councils where the size of the majority depends monotonically on the change in interest rate within a particular time frame. Small changes in interest rate require a small share of supporting votes, even less than 50%. We show that flexible...

We suggest that flexible majority rules for currency issuance decisions foster the stability of a cryptocurrency. With flexible majority rules, the voteshare needed to approve a particular currency issuance growth is increasing with this growth rate. By choosing suitable parameters for these...