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On banking regulation and lobbying
Gersbach, Hans; Papageorgiou, Stylianos - 2019 - This version: January 2019
We study the political economy of bank capital regulation from a positive and normative perspective. In a general … politicians. We show that bankers and politicians agree on lobbying contributions and capital regulation that renders banks … capital regulation standards from international agreements eliminate lobbying incentives, yielding an efficient and fair …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011962140
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The Risk Weights of the IRB Approaches
Gersbach, Hans - 2005
The article analyses the risk weights of the IRB approaches as suggested by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in January 2001. It is shown that the risk weight formulas can be considerably simplified to an elementary formula which has become a part of later suggestions of the Basel...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012784993
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On the Coexistence of Banks and Markets
Gersbach, Hans; Uhlig, Harald - Sonderforschungsbereich Ökonomisches Risiko <Berlin> - 2006
We examine the coexistence of banks and financial markets, studyinga credit market where the qualities of investment projects are notobservable and the investment decisions of entrepreneurs are not contractible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005854968
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On banking regulation and lobbying
Gersbach, Hans; Papageorgiou, Stylianos - 2019
We study the political economy of bank capital regulation from a positive and normative perspective. In a general … politicians. We show that bankers and politicians agree on lobbying contributions and capital regulation that renders banks … capital regulation standards from international agreements eliminate lobbying incentives, yielding an efficient and fair …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011985390
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The Price of Lobbying in Banking
Gersbach, Hans - 2020
We study how bankers can elicit lower capital requirements via lobbying: Bankers pledge to politicians a lobbying rate as a fraction of bank revenues, thus relating politicians' welfare to the size of banks. This induces politicians to lower capital requirements, which causes high leverage...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012850408
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Debt Contracts, Collapse and Regulation as Competition Phenomena
Gersbach, Hans; Uhlig, Harald - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997
if the permissible types of contracts are limited by regulation resembling the separation of investment and commercial …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661861
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On the Coexistence of Banks and Markets
Gersbach, Hans; Uhlig, Harald - Sonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko, … - 2006
We examine the coexistence of banks and financial markets, studying a credit market where the qualities of investment projects are not observable and the investment decisions of entrepreneurs are not contractible. Standard banks can alleviate moral-hazard problems by securing a portion of a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005677908
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Capital regulation and credit fluctuations
Gersbach, Hans; Rochet, Jean-Charles - 2012
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009621823
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Private insurance against systemic crisis?
Gersbach, Hans - 2009
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003875375
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Capital regulation and credit fluctuations
Gersbach, Hans; Rochet, Jean-Charles - In: Macroprudentialism, (pp. 89-95). 2014
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011507360