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In this paper, we argue for a regulatory framework under which a bank’s required level of equity capital depends on the equity capital of its peers. Such bankingon- the-average rules are transparent and could also be combined with the current regulatory framework. In addition, we argue that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008732399
In the presence of macroeconomic shocks severe enough to threaten the liquidity or solvency of the banking system, the regulator can rely on the funds concentration effect to save long-term investment projects. Some banks are forced into bankruptcy with the result that other banks obtain more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011400865
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012117631
In this paper, we argue for a regulatory framework under which a bank’s required level of equity capital depends on the equity capital of its peers. Such bankingon- the-average rules are transparent and could also be combined with the current regulatory framework. In addition, we argue that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753171
Bank leverage constraints can emerge from regulatory capital requirements as well as from central bank collateral requirements in reserve lending facilities. While these two channels are usually examined separately, we are able to compare them with the help of a bank money creation model in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012585515
We integrate banks and the coexistence of bank and bond financing into an otherwise standard New Keynesian framework. There are two policy-makers: a central banker, who can decide on short-term nominal interest rates, and a macroprudential policy-maker, who can vary aggregate capital...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011894696
We study the political economy of bank capital regulation from a positive and normative perspective. In a general equilibrium setting, capital requirements and lobbying contributions are determined as the outcome of bargaining between banks and politicians. We show that bankers and politicians...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011962140
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003976543
We examine the impact of so-called "Crisis Contracts" on bank managers' risktaking incentives and on the probability of banking crises. Under a Crisis Contract, managers are required to contribute a pre-specified share of their past earnings to finance public rescue funds when a crisis occurs....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010337016
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001369561